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There are different ways of theorising dyslexia and different ways of constructing 
meanings around dyslexia in different learning contexts. This paper considers the 
role of neoliberalist ideology in shaping conversations about dyslexia and 
µfairness¶during two focus group conversations analysed as part of a study into 
the discursive construction of dyslexia in higher education. Ideological analysis 
was undertaken with reference to Gee¶s discourse analysis and Willig¶s concept 
of the use of discursive resources in interaction. Investigation identified 
neoliberalist ideology as a powerful voice within the analysed texts, and as 
directive for identity and action. This paper argues that recognition of the ways 
in which neoliberalist ideology shapes everyday conversation about learning and 
learning differences is vital in the construction and maintenance of fairer higher 
education in the UK. 
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Introduction 
 
Dyslexia is recognised in the UK to be a specific learning difficulty characterised by 
what are often termed as cognitive or neurological deficits which impact upon 
reading ability (Nicolson and Fawcett 2008). However, there is much argument 
about how dyslexia is defined, where it comes from, and how it is identified (Ho 
2004; Stanovich 2005; Elliott and Grigorenko 2014). Cognitive psychology dominates 
in the field of dyslexia, and it is experts from this field who thus help to shape the practice of 
dyslexia assessment and support within the British education system. Powerful 
organisations (such as Dyslexia Action) and lobby groups (such as those affiliated to the 
British Dyslexia Association [BDA]) also influence the direction of practice (see e.g. 
the µBDA Quality Mark¶conferred by the BDA to organisations which meet its standards for 
specialist provision: BDA 2015). Varying media representations of dyslexia 
also contribute to the controversy surrounding the label (see e.g. Hitchens 2014). One 
result of the many popular competing conceptions of dyslexia, the multiple interest 
groups, and the shifting diagnostic goalposts is that the term µdyslexia¶has become 
connotatively loaded and confusing. 
 
Elliott and Grigorenko (2014) make a strong case for a move away from the use of 
the term dyslexia as a scientific and educational category, especially in higher 
education, and they suggest that provision of specialist support solely for the sub-group 
of poor-readers labelled dyslexic is unjustified. However, this paper argues that, while 
they contribute greatly to the conversation, cognitive psychologists such as Elliott and 
Grigorenko have insufficiently attended to the experiences of dyslexic people and the 
ways in which different learning contexts and discourses shape the ways dyslexia is 
understood and managed (Riddick 2010; see Pollak 2005 for a detailed exploration 
of the different identities dyslexic students can take on). There is also, arguably, a tendency 
for psychological science to forget that its measurements and conclusions are the 
product of social processes and are therefore not a neutral route to the discovery of 
µfacts¶(Latour 1987). This is not a criticism: it is a reminder. It is argued here that 
such scientific study should be considered alongside attention to the socially situated 
aspects of learning and learning difficulty, to the discursive construction of learning 
differences and disabilities in context, and to the people whom have been labelled in 
whatever domain as outside a norm. 
 
There is a conception among some parents, educators, dyslexic people and other 
members of the public that dyslexia is a myth and that the specific literacy difficulties 
associated with dyslexia are instead a result of laziness or stupidity (Riddick 1995; 
McDermott, Goldman, and Varenne 2006). This is arguably a misconstrual of scientific 
research which questions the existence of dyslexia as a specific sub-group rather than 
questioning the existence of people who struggle in specific cognitive or behavioural domains. 
Alongside the perception that dyslexia is a myth is the feeling that a dyslexic student is 
somehow cheating by getting extra help that other students do not get. If the student feels that 
she or he may be cheating in the name of a mythical condition, there is some evidence that 
this student will be less likely to make use of accommodations offered in an educational 
institution (Marshall 2001; May 2001; Ferri et al. 2005; Denhart 2008). Whether or not the 
provision of accommodations is fair or not is not the subject of this paper; rather, the point 
being made here is that such perceptions and behaviours are in part driven by discourses 
which draw heavily upon neoliberalist ideology (see below). 
 
Neoliberalism, education and dyslexia 
 Neoliberalist ideology is understood here as a web of discursive and material practices 
which upholds the idea of the market and the individual as the ideal starting point for 
shaping the social and institutional worlds in which we live, and which presents competition 
and deregulation as necessities for freedom and progress. But beyond this, its 
twin ideals of µprivatisation and personal responsibility¶(Duggan 2003, 12) are defined 
in such a way as to give the outward impression of cultural neutrality, µa way of being 
reasonable¶(Duggan 2003, 10) that manages to shift concerns about inequality into the 
µprivate¶domain (Duggan 2003, 14). In other words, one¶s difficulties and personal 
challenges become one¶s own business, and one should not make a fuss about them 
in order to be given (according to neoliberalism) an unfair advantage. Dyslexia, 
under such a discursive regime, becomes the individual¶s problem, not the problem 
of the state (or the educational institution). Furthermore, efforts to address the disadvantaging 
of groups of people with learning differences by promoting respect for neurodiversity are 
diminished by the neoliberalism which works to both µsubordinate and 
commodify difference¶(Runswick-Cole 2014, 1118). 
 
Universities are increasingly becoming a force for individualism (Williams 2014). 
The discourse has shifted from a recognition of universities as beneficial to all in 
society, to an emphasis upon individual gain by those who attend, and individual 
responsibility for success. Moreover, universities are increasingly under pressure place 
economic growth and employability as central concerns and to shrink the attention they 
give to any practices which are not market driven (Johnson 2008). The traditional (and 
non-market driven) role of the university as a critical voice of government and society is 
then diminished (Williams 2014). There has also been a subsequent shift in perceptions 
in what is valuable in a student¶s university education from knowledge and learning in 
and of itself, to those aspects of what students appear to be doing which increases 
marketability (Ainley and Weyers 2008). 
 
One of the outcomes of talking about learning, disability and education without 
recognising or challenging neoliberalist discourse is that getting on alone in any 
walk of life is usually presented as a good and admirable achievement. In other 
words, neoliberalist discourse promotes the American ideal of the individual who succeeds 
with sheer effort and determination and does not ask for help (Dudley-Marling 
2004, 483). Promotion of this idea to those in education may mean that a student 
will not ask for help, for fear this will be perceived as weakness (Dudley-Marling 
2004). This survivor rhetoric can also lead to oversimplification and imbalance, by 
only promoting those stories where people have overcome a particular set of odds 
(Ferri et al. 2005). For those who are unable to overcome such odds there is the likelihood of 
self-blame. 
 
The dyslexia label 
 The labelling of educational difference is fraught with difficulties, and this is no less the 
case for dyslexia (Ho 2004). Elliot and Grigorenko (2014) argue that disagreements 
about where the cut-off point should be in identifying dyslexia reflect their understanding that 
there is no distinct group to whom the label should be applied. However, that 
decisions about cut-off points can be problematic does not mean the label is without 
value. It is likewise not the categorisation itself which is to blame for unequal provision 
of resources: this is instead an allocation problem (Riddick 2010). Dyslexia is not, and 
cannot be, a socially neutral label; its meaning is bound to political, educational, and 
social contexts, and to individual experiences. From this perspective, a neat, static definition 
of dyslexia would not be the ultimate goal; the emphasis would instead be placed 
on understanding the role of context and history in helping to create the shifting construct of 
dyslexia (Danermark 2002). 
 
The category µdyslexia¶may be seen in part as a product of capitalism, µconcerned 
with distilling worth from bodies previously understood to be worthless¶(Campbell 
2013, 213). The µworth¶of people in formal education is arguably closely tied to 
their performance of particular literacy practices. It is not the cognitive difference 
which produces the disability, therefore, but the centrality of high literacy to conceptions of 
individual worth: µwe should not let ³dyslexia´disguise or cloak Lexism, 
which is the real issue¶(Collinson 2012, 69). Being proficient at reading and writing 
is of such cultural value that it is hard to µmake positive sense¶of difficulties in 
these domains (Gwernen-Jones 2012, 16). Moreover, we should not underestimate 
the discursive connections between literacy practices and conceptions of academic 
ability, which make it difficult for individual learners to resist µthe rules of the game¶ 
(Collinson and Penketh 2009, 15; see Macdonald 2009 for a similar perspective). 
Attention to experiences of dyslexia is also one way of engaging with the anti-labelling 
movement present in some of the literature in the field (Macdonald 2010). It is by 
listening to people¶s experiences we might better understand the uses of the label in 
everyday contexts. It is also important to recognise that the genuine attempts by cognitive 
scientists such as Elliott and Grigorenko to reveal the contradictions and potential 
misuses of µdyslexia¶as a diagnostic category are potentially being hijacked in the 
neoliberalist cause, consciously or unwittingly. Much of the power of neoliberalism here 
lies in its appearance as common sense, and in the familiarity of its language: µneoliberalism 
gets into our minds and our souls, into the ways in which we think about what we 
do, and into our social relations with others «¶(Ball 2012, 18). The aim in this paper is 
to offer some insight into the ways in which talk about and around dyslexia, by dyslexic 
students, is moulded through ideological push and pull: with particular attention to the 
work of neoliberalist discourse. 
 
Methodology 
 In concurrence with Billig (2001) the aim in this research µis to see how the themes of 
ideology are instantiated in ordinary talk, and how speakers are part of, and are continuing, 
the ideological history of the discourse themes they are using¶(218). The current 
research uses a relatively loose understanding of ideology as belief systems (after Van 
Dijk 2006) expressed through discourses; or, after Giroux (1997), as a µweight¶in discourses 
that may not be immediately obvious. Ideology can also shape sets of beliefs or 
values which are eventually understood as common sense, and, write Carr and Hartnett, 
µwhat is distinctive about common sense is that it is an inherited way of thinking « 
inevitably impregnated with the myths, superstitions and prejudices of the past¶ 
(1996, 3). By the time the ideas have become µcommon sense¶their ideological 
nature is obscured. This need not mean the common sense view is µwrong¶or negative, 
but that it no longer has questions asked of it; it is this understanding of ideological 
common sense that is used in the current paper. 
 
The researcher organised two focus group conversations, one with six participants 
and one with seven participants, which were audio recorded and transcribed. The participants 
were all dyslexic students studying at a single higher education institution. The 
focus group conversations were stimulated through use of broad and open questions 
around the topic of dyslexia and study at university. The researcher allowed the conversation 
to develop in a participant-led direction after these open questions had been 
asked, though new topics were introduced once a particular discussion appeared to 
have come to a natural end. The transcripts were analysed using the guidance of Gee 
(2005, 2009) and Willig (2008) to identify (from an interpretivist perspective) the 
ways in which the participants made use of ideologically laden discourse in their 
constructions of dyslexia. The feelings and perspectives shared by participants were 
considered to be a partial product of the particular conversational context, and 
fundamentally tied to the language used; certain perspectives and feelings may have 
been difficult to construct because of the particular social peculiarities of conversing 
with others (including myself as a researcher) in the given environment. As such, it 
was understood that some perspectives and experiences may have been avoided. 
This approach is in keeping with a critical realist perspective (after Bhaskar 1998). 
As such, it is considered that feelings and emotions are primarily socially and discursively 
produced, yet are not separable from the humans who experience them; or, as 
Harré puts it, an emotion is an µinterplay between social conventions, moral judgements 
and bodily reactions¶(1991, 143). Emotions may be understood as µquasi objects¶(after 
Latour 1991); µmuch more social, much more fabricated, much more collective than the 
³hard´parts of nature¶(55). Recognising feelings or emotions as µcollective activity¶ 
(Billig 2001, 213) arguably makes it easier to identify the ways in which some feelings 
or emotions can be µput to work¶for political ends (Williams 2001, 11) and can 
strengthen dominant ideologies. 
 The analytical approach considered narratives, social context and linguistics as important 
analytical aspects (after Gee 2005; Willig 2008). It also considered that institutions 
and other aspects of social life have a material existence as well as a discursive one. This 
is again in keeping with critical realism in the recognition that sociological study is concerned 
with a different ontological level of reality from biological study and requires a 
different methodological approach (Danermark 2002). This does not mean that the biological 
and psychological are not important elements in the experience of dyslexia, but 
that these are not the most useful starting points for the present investigation. It does 
mean that the social model of disability may not alone be sufficient as a philosophical 
basis for understanding disability; recognition of the material and of individual experiences is 
also essential (Riddick 2001; Gwernen-Jones 2012). Gee¶s (2005) approach to 
discourse analysis takes a balanced look at socio-historical factors, personal narrative, 
social languages, linguistics and local contexts. Gee recognises that people have 
differentiated access to different kinds of language in different contexts, and therefore, 
different possible ways of being in those contexts. Willig advises the analyst to µlocate the 
various constructions of the object within wider discourses¶(2008, 115); she asks for 
attention to significant words or phrases that seem to be relevant, or seem to indicate a wider 
discourse. Willig leaves it open as to how a wider discourse should be recognised. 
This work is concerned with examination of meaning in context, rather than analysis of 
linguistic form and function from a more abstract perspective (Gee 2009). The 
current analysis drew upon Gee¶s approach to critical discourse analysis in an exploration of 
intertextuality and ideology in the focus group texts, but only to the degree that it 
corresponded to the given research questions. Linguistic elements are combined with a 
broader thematic analysis which relies more heavily on social contexts. 
Undertaking such an analysis involved several stages: after gaining familiarity with 
the audio recordings, the transcripts were read and reread. Notes were made in the 
margins of the transcripts to identify points of interest and record initial thoughts. 
Each line of the texts was numbered. Time was taken to work gradually through the 
texts with attention to the ways in which language was used to construct meaning 
around dyslexia. Attention was given to the evolving narratives, to linguistic structure, 
and to the (interpreted) localised meaning of words and phrases. Careful notes were 
written in the margins. When this process was completed, the transcripts and notes 
were reread and the researcher reflected upon the links and contradictions between 
the different discourses. During this stage of analysis, several key themes were 
named. It is recognised that these themes were a product of the researcher¶s interpretation of 
the text, and other analyses may have led to a different set of themes. 
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 Findings and discussion 
 
It is argued in this discussion that neoliberalist ideology is prevalent in the focus group 
discussions and that this ideology produces particular ways-of-being dyslexic in higher 
education. The discussion is arranged according to three key themes: grades, effort and 
merit; self-blame and self-help; and equality versus fairness. The first of these thematic 
sections includes extracts in which participants construct the existence of direct and 
unproblematic relationships between hard work, merit and success within the education 
system. Within this initial discussion attention is given to ideas of effort and success 
which are central to the construction of the µrugged individual¶in the American 
Dream (Rand 1957/1992; Greene 2008). The second thematic section questions the 
ways in which the participants and the researcher located educational success and 
failure within the individual, and drew upon common sense understandings to isolate 
individuals from their social contexts. Adoption of this group of ideologies via meritocratic 
and individualist discourse had profound implications for identity construction in 
the given context, but also pointed towards particular behaviours and self-concepts 
which probably persisted beyond the focus group conversations. The final themed 
section considers how the rhetoric of neoliberalism selectively draws upon democratic 
ideology, and discusses the ways in which the participants were situated precariously 
between such contradictory µideals¶when they talked about dyslexia. 
 
Key to transcription: 
[ ] ± square brackets indicate overlapping speech 
, - comma indicates brief pause 
. ± full stop indicates downward intonation and longer pause 
 
Effort and merit 
 
Below are two extracts, both dialogues between the researcher (H) and S. Both extracts 
arguably powerfully uphold the notion of the struggling, and succeeding individual. 
Extract from focus group one: S and H 
 
S: It was something I always felt, well, just deal with it. I mean I suppose it has influenced 
me in that when I come to do work I sort of apply masses amounts of time, 
and I¶ll read twice as, I¶ll read five times as much as anyone else does and do ten 
times as much research. 
H: mmm. mmm. 
S: erm, so that might be overcompensating a bit in and that¶s sort of my general mentality 
anyway? 
S is talking about how he experienced being dyslexic at school. He said elsewhere in the 
conversation that school teachers did not really take much notice of his dyslexia ± and 
here S tells us how much effort he put into his work, and how he coped by himself. The 
line µ«I always felt, well, just deal with it¶gives the impression of an internal voice, 
an inner µS¶who counselled the µouter¶S on how to be. S is then emphatic about the 
amount of effort he puts into his work as a way of dealing with the challenges of dyslexia. 
The (likely) over-exaggeration in µI¶ll read twice as, I¶ll read five times as much 
«do ten times as much «¶is put to the task of positive identity construction. The use 
of µI¶ll¶here is used to indicate a tendency or habit, something that is common-place for 
him. His construction of himself here fits well with the idea of the µrugged individual¶ 
(Greene 2008), a µmoral¶individual, and someone who compares favourably to µanyone 
else¶in terms of effort put in. This hard-work ethic is part of his µgeneral mentality¶: a 
construction of an internal character trait which may be interpreted as admirable. In this 
sense, S presents himself, intentionally or not, as the ideal worker, productive and 
uncomplaining. His specific statement of how much additional work he undertakes 
compared to others might be seen as an attempt to maintain his position as morally 
worthy in a landscape which condemns those who fall behind to µcontinuously teeter 
on the brink of moral regulation¶(Ball 2012, 20). It also presents his own success as 
separate from the community he is working within; others appear only present to 
help identify where in the competitive hierarchy he sits. This hard-working, uncomplaining, 
getting-on-with-it self, the ideal self of neoliberalism, is also one who 
cannot both ask for help and maintain his favourable identity if he remains within 
this ideological landscape. S repeatedly presents himself as a survivor who does not 
need any hand-outs. 
In the extract below, the researcher begins by asking the group how they feel about 
being µdisabled¶according to British law. 
 
Extract from focus group one: H and S 
 
H: «In in the law, dyslexia is a disability, so erm, according to them you are all 
disabled. I just wondered if you feel like you¶re disabled or, or not. Or, if not, 
what does it, what does it actually mean? 
S: personally, no, but I¶ve just always had to deal with it. It¶s like having having a bad 
ham string, you¶ve still got to run a race, [run] the race, regardlessly of 
H:                                                               [mm] 
S: how badly he¶s injured. Erm, but I can totally imagine that other people may feel 
disabled. 
 
The way S responds to the question is interesting because he uses the metaphor of the 
runner with a µbad ham string¶to support the argument that he is not disabled. This is 
surprising, in some ways, because one might expect the runner with a damaged ham 
string (in this analogy) to be an excellent example of a person who exactly is disabled, 
particularly in the context of a race. Arguably, this oddness or mismatch between the 
metaphor and the position it is being used to support is a reflection of the power of 
the individualising, survivalist ideology to overwhelm socially familiar constructions 
of (physical) disability. If S constructs himself as the injured runner, battling on 
through the µrace¶to educational accomplishment, he appears to be assuming the 
race is compulsory, and the only honourable way to proceed is without acknowledging 
his weakness, and without asking for any consideration of the unequal level at which he 
is participating. He finishes µI can totally imagine other people may feel disabled.¶In 
one stroke he elevates himself above the µothers¶who are not as tough or resilient as 
him, or those who need to rely upon a µdisability¶label. He constructs disability as a 
mere feeling and as something one can therefore decide to overcome with enough 
strength of character, and, crucially, he entrenches himself in this conversational turn 
so firmly within this particular ideological position that it takes a good number of 
conversational turns for him to credibly position himself in any other way. From this position 
it is arguably impossible for S to say that accepting help is an honourable or 
socially admirable thing to do: making use of µreasonable adjustments¶is likewise 
incommensurate with the self as survivor. His ideological position also impacts upon 
the positions other participants can easily take up in subsequent turns because to say 
they needed help would be to construct themselves as morally inferior under this discursive 
regime (Dudley-Marling 2004). This is an example of how assuming a particular ideological 
stance can have hidden consequences ± in this case, arguably, aninvisible self-discipline 
which places all eyes upon on the individual and absolves society of any responsibility. This 
perspective echoes the conclusions in the literature which suggest dyslexic students tend to 
take responsibility for their own difficulties, and put in additional effort in order to comply 
and µsucceed¶(e.g. Riccick 2001; Gwernen-Jones 2012). 
 
Self-blame and self-help 
 
S is by no means the only participant who draws upon discourses loyal to individualising and 
meritocratic ideologies: this ideological backdrop was almost always there in 
the participants¶constructions of themselves, each other, and education. S¶s identity 
as the struggling, uncomplaining survivor was mirrored again and again by others in 
each of the focus groups. For example, D said (focus group one [FG1]) that in the 
real world µmy feeling is that you just need to compensate by being good at something 
else¶, and later, D again, the reality is you just have to work harder, like, cos people can help 
you, give you Dictaphones and stuff, give you all the help in the world, but in the end you¶ve 
just got to sit down and work. And here is R later in FG1: µI don¶t see it as a disability at all. I 
just see it as something that I need to know about, to compensate for «so it¶s more for my 
understanding than for anyone else¶s understanding¶; and J, focus group two (FG2): µyou just 
live with it, you compensate, you just kind of find little ways around doing things¶. In these 
lines there appears to be a kind of echo in the phrasing used: µyou just have to¶, µyou just 
need to¶, µyou¶ve just got to¶, µyou just live with it¶in which the µjust¶gives the 
impression that the action is simple and obvious and should be done without complaint, 
and the µyou¶generalises the obligation to everyone who faces a similar challenge. The 
generalised advice via µyou¶is often paired up with a personalised edge to the speaker¶s 
perspective through, for example, µmy feeling is¶, µfor my understanding¶, µpersonally¶, 
µI just see it as¶. The emphasis upon their opinions allows them to escape potential 
accusation of judging others for weakness, yet the use of generalising µyou¶arguably 
implies that the speakers were constructing broader condemnation of those who 
µjust¶could not deal with it. All of the participants are succeeding academically according to 
conventional understandings of academic achievement simply because they are 
students at an elite university; they are running S¶s race despite their damaged hamstrings and 
can see the finish line ± but there are people behind them, and people who have dropped out 
of the race who, from a neoliberalist perspective, are not deserving of sympathy; they did not 
strive hard enough. µ[T]hose who are strong in the face of adversity and who work hard will 
succeed¶says the American Dream (McGuinnis 2009, 62). In subscribing to meritocratic 
beliefs like this one, individuals are more likely to blame those who do not µsucceed¶for their 
own failure, and to give greater respect to those who do µsucceed¶(see McCoy and Major 
2007, for a summary of the research in this area). 
 
Early in FG2 M implies that focusing upon the organic causes of dyslexia can allow 
dyslexic people to be distracted from their responsibility for their own success. Finding 
out what µcauses¶dyslexia can make it easier for the µaverage¶dyslexic person to µnot 
combat¶it; in other words, believing that dyslexia has a particular, internal cause can be 
used as an excuse not to work hard to overcome one¶s own weaknesses, or as G says, to 
µdeal with it, deal with it¶. 
 
Extract from FG2: M, G, J and H 
 
M: Now obviously if you are a researcher of dyslexia, it¶s very interesting to find out 
what causes [it, but for the] average dyslexic person. 
H:                 [so what is    ] 
M: but it can be useful for the average dyslexic person because it makes it much easier 
to not combat it, cos, that sounds really aggressive, but if you know how to combat 
    [something, to] makes it [easier to ] 
J: [to build          ] 
M: but if someone could say to me 
G: deal with it, deal with it. 
 
M and G together here construct what might be interpreted as a damning judgement 
upon people who refer to their disability in order to argue for reasonable adjustments 
and a fair playing field, people for whom an organic µcause¶might be crucial. In M¶s 
discourse, the individual is ultimately accountable for their own success, and is to be 
blamed for their own failure. µThe assumptions of the ideology are that of the individual 
as an autonomous self, while education is seen as neutral¶(McGinnis 2009, 62); and the 
institution is absolved of any responsibility. 
 
Instead of encouraging a sense of support and connectedness within the student 
community, individualising and meritocratic ideologies help to create isolated, competitive 
individuals who measure their own success through narrow comparison with 
others (i.e. according to educational institution, level and grade). This encourages 
overt criticism of peers and creates an atmosphere of judgement and condescension 
which leaves little room for collaboration and cooperation. Some of the participants 
found themselves straddling a rigid, dominant individualism and another ideological 
position which said, in essence, µit¶s not fair¶. There was at once an impression that 
all obstacles should be individually overcome without fuss, and the contradictory 
sense that the educational context was leaving them severely and unacceptably 
disadvantaged. 
 
Equality versus fairness 
 
The construction of the self in comparison and in competition with others is a strong 
theme throughout the focus group conversations. This group of constructions 
appears to straddle the idea that things should be µfair¶, and the idea that µit¶s all 
about hard-work, so stop complaining¶. Nowhere is the fine balance between egalitarian, 
democratic, meritocratic, individualistic, and neoliberal ideologies more apparent 
(in these focus groups) than when participants were discussing the use, or not, or the 
fairness, or not, of µreasonable adjustments¶. µReasonable adjustments¶is the term 
used to refer to institutions¶legal obligation to try to create a level playing field for 
participation; that is, it is required that the university put in place adjustments in 
assessment and teaching, for example, to reduce the disadvantage minority groups 
experience during their studies. Dyslexic students are legally µdisabled¶and they 
therefore have the right to adjustments like extra time in exams, considerate 
marking, a specialist dyslexia tutor, a computer and assistive software, lecture notes 
before the lecture, and sometimes a proof-reader, scribe or mentor, among other 
things. In both focus group conversations the use of such adjustments is a topic for 
heated discussion. 
 
Below is a discussion of the ideological presence in example extracts in which the 
participants construct the use of adjustments as negative, unfair or dishonourable. First, 
here is R in the second focus group, responding to a request for clarification about his 
position on reasonable adjustments: 
 Extract from FG2: H, R and M 
 
H: OK, I¶ll ramble on till then [then] but you were saying that you didn¶t want 
M:                                             [yeah] 
H: anyone to make any adjustments for you. Is that right? 
R: yeah. I consider a degree a bit like becoming a medical doctor. If you¶re, if you 
don¶t have that standard, I don¶t see how I should qualify. 
H: ok. 
 
First of all, µbecoming a medical doctor¶is upheld as the ultimate in academic and 
moral achievement (still popularly understood as an occupation of the elites, see 
Mathers and Parry 2009), and a standard against which other achievements may be 
measured. The assumption is that one cannot become a doctor without a good deal 
of individual merit. Furthermore, a µstandard¶is something that you µhave¶; that is, 
either it is contained within you, or it is not, and tough luck if it is not. The standard 
you are set at is understood to be fair and accurate, and conveniently allows comparison 
between individuals. This may seem democratic, but, argue Carr and Hartnett (1996) is 
an µelitist conception of democracy¶(171) and one which only imitates egalitarianism. 
Having a degree is lifted to a similar intellectual and moral status to becoming a medical 
doctor; it is a symbol of worth that would be tainted if people were to come by such an 
accolade without the correct µstandard¶. My interpretation of R¶s position here is that 
making µadjustments¶would lead to just such a taint. 
Below is which begins with R talking about the value of rote learning, and continues 
with J and M affirming his ideological position. It is an important extract to include 
because it illustrates how ideological assumptions can have implications for identity 
and action. 
 
Extract from FG2: R, J and M 
 
R: look, I think, [it¶s not easy] and it¶s not easy for dyslexics, but I think 
J:                        [hhhhh         ] 
R: rote-learning does have a place in this in this education that we¶re doing now. I 
think it¶s just a reality that we find hard. 
J: I think, cos I wouldn¶t want to get a first, and know that it was because I had dyslexia, 
when I [get that] I want to know that it¶s because I¶ve done it 
M:       [mmm    ] 
J: and to the same, to like their standard 
M: mmm 
J: and so like, I agree. [with what you¶re saying] 
M:                                  [mmmm you want your ] 
J: [yeah you¶ve got a degree and you¶re dyslexic                           ] or 
M: [first to be the same as this person¶s first or that person¶s first ] 
J: you got it [cos] you¶re dyslexic, you wanna know that you 
M:               [mm] 
M: mmm 
J: achieved it the same [as]   
 
The phrase R uses ± µI think, it¶s not easy for dyslexics, but «¶might give the 
impression of sympathy, but in fact works to set up the idea that dyslexic students 
should nonetheless get on and cope. And R¶s introductory µlook¶constructs his talk 
as being frank, honest and straight to the point, and therefore difficult to resist. R does 
not say that all learning should be rote learning; he says it has µa place¶± once again this 
is hard to resist because it would be fairly extreme to argue that all rote learning should 
be outlawed. He then presents rote learning as a µreality¶of university education. Rote 
learning in educational institutions, argue Carr and Hartnett, was about efficiency in a 
market-driven system (1996). Under this market hegemony, there was a move towards 
knowledge transmission over inquiry-based learning (Carr and Hartnett 1996), a move 
which gave pride of place to memorisation and learning by rote. Moreover, it is 
common sense that what is µreality¶cannot be changed; so for R, there is no alternative 
but to fit in with the system as best as you can. If R did not have the dyslexia label, his 
comment here (in a group of people with the label) might have produced a retort such as 
µwhat would you know?¶, but as he is dyslexic, R¶s position is beyond easy criticism. 
It is interesting that J and M respond immediately with a similar stance to R. J says: 
I think, cos I wouldn¶t want to get a first, and know that it was because I had dyslexia, 
when I get that I want to know that it¶s because I¶ve done it «and to the same, to like 
their standard. 
 
From this perspective, reasonable adjustments are considered a threat to the independent 
success of the dyslexic student and a risk to the worth of their degree. They are also 
constructed as fundamentally unfair, in line with an understanding that in a µdemocracy¶ 
everyone should be treated equally (which obviously ignores the fact that µequal¶may 
not mean µfair¶). This version of democracy again fits with Carr and Hartnett¶s idea of 
µelitist¶democracy (1996); one in which it benefits the most privileged in a society to 
uphold the idea of fair treatment for all, as long as this ignores the disparity in individuals¶ 
circumstances and degree of social and cultural capital (Bourdieu 1991). It is also worth 
noting here the language of µgetting¶or µhaving¶a degree, the idea of a degree as something 
you possess, and this possession as more valuable than the learning process; µstudents seek to 
³have a degree´ rather than ³be learners´¶(Molesworth, Nixon, and 
Scullion 2009, 277; see also Ainley and Weyers 2008). 
 
Although some participants maintained their ideological stance on reasonable adjustments 
relatively consistently throughout the conversations, individual participants 
appeared to be torn upon the issue. Here is C half way through extract 35, talking 
about how she felt about the µfree stuff¶she received after being identified as dyslexic. 
 
Extract from FG1: C, S and H 
 
C: «well, when I was diagnosed, I got all this equipment through and people were 
like that¶s ridicu[lous  ] like [hh    ] why do you get a 
S:                       [mmm]       [mmm] 
C: printer just cos you¶re dyslexic? But it has really helped to like, print out your 
lecture notes, when you go to the lecture and that, so, [but   ] you do feel 
S:                                                                                   [mmm] 
C: a bit unfair because I am getting all this stuff for free. But then I guess you do need 
it, but then I have managed without it, before. 
H: yeah. 
C: so. I don¶t know, but. I¶m like, well, I¶m entitled to it, so I¶ll have it. 
H: yeah. 
C: so 
H: yeah 
 
In the extract above C tries to manage the connected ideals of fairness and merit, and 
struggles to reach a conclusion about what these ideals mean for her behaviour. C 
begins by referring to the response of other people: µthey were like, that¶s ridiculous 
like why do you get a printer just cos you¶re dyslexic?¶and so she is under pressure 
to justify the equipment she was given. µ[I]t has really helped¶says C µbut you do feel 
a bit unfair¶; µBut then I do need it, but then I have managed without it before¶. C repeatedly 
switches between constructions of entitlement and guilt. This uncomfortable switching is 
arguably reflective the tensions between egalitarian-democratic and meritocratic 
ideological positions. The former allows C to justify her adjustments on the grounds 
that she has a greater need than others, while the latter condemns any means of getting 
ahead which does not come from an individual¶s merit or hard work. British Law on 
µequality¶here is in danger of being eclipsed by the unwritten laws of meritocracy and 
capitalism. This feeling of discomfort about making use of adjustments and preferring 
to manage alone is reported elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Mortimore 2012). 
 
Conclusions 
 
In these focus groups, the common sense understanding that success is based upon 
merit and hard work frequently shut down other ways of constructing achievement 
and fairness in education. On a number of occasions students in this study found themselves 
uncomfortably stuck between democratic, social justice, and meritocratic ideals, 
and with tension, swung between different social identities which were only acceptable 
if the conversation were blowing in a particular ideological direction. Moreover, 
constructions of identity, learning and ability were very readily formed from an 
individualistic ideological perspective; that is, the individualistic and neoliberal versions of 
students and education and equality appeared to be the default in these conversations. 
To resist these constructions involved discursive effort and sometimes meant social 
discomfort and/ or isolation for the participant introducing such resistance. 
Part of the power of ideological hegemony at work here is to produce people who 
cannot see beyond the common sense structures which they draw upon uncritically in 
their meaning making (Apple 2004, 6). Not only can people not see beyond these structures, 
but arguably actively reproduce them. In such reproduction, symbols like grades 
become desirable; according to Deleuze and Guatari, the desire for hierarchical markers 
is a way of repressing other desires (for freedom, self-determination) which threaten the 
social structure as is: µrepression, hierarchy, exploitation, and servitude are themselves 
desired¶(Deleuze and Guattari 2013, 139). Furthermore, the very thing which might 
arm students against such self-repression, namely, the ability to think critically and 
to question self-evident µtruths¶, is arguably itself dulled by the practices of the neoliberal 
university (Molesworth, Nixon, and Scullion 2009). 
 
In the introduction to this paper, attention was given to the controversies within the 
field of dyslexia research and practice, and particularly to Elliott and Grigorenko¶s 
(2014) arguments that dyslexia is no longer a useful term in most research and educational 
contexts. What the current research adds to this argument does not come in 
the form of an endorsement or a rally against such a position. What it does argue is 
that no matter what labels we attach to learners in education, no matter how noble 
the intention, these labels do not stand still. They are pushed into a world of competing 
discursive constructions and ideological µcommon sense¶which fragment and hijack 
intended meanings. Even with a robust and exacting scientific definition, dyslexia (or 
a replacement term) would still collect socially determined and context-bound 
meanings (Danermark 2002). Moreover, many of the socially constructed and most disabling 
aspects of dyslexia would remain, despite a change in definition. For example, 
those discourses which connect traditional educational achievement and high literacy to 
µintellect¶would remain (Macdonald 2009). As such, any decision to end its use in education 
and education should not come from one discursive field alone. Psychology 
helps us to understand the cognitive dimensions of dyslexia; but it is lacking in the 
tools to explore the how and why and what of its social and political construction. 
The position in this paper is that we need to think about what a change in labelling 
might mean for people (Riddick 2010); how it might impact upon already threatened 
attempts to equalise the playing field in western education systems; and why, when 
we look back through a history littered with discarded labels, do we consider that it 
at this moment science has discovered the correct answer. 
 To reiterate, then, developing tools to resist potential devaluation of the achievements and 
participation of students with learning differences is an important part of 
the fight for fairness within the higher education system. Explicitly encouraging students and 
educators to recognise the ideological voice in everyday conversation is 
essential for such a critical education and for a fairer education system. In other 
words, better understanding of the discourses surrounding dyslexia and of the ideological 
threads which speak through us when we speak will arguably assist students and 
teachers in higher education to critically reflect upon the learning identities they take 
on, or are given. Challenge is only possible if people recognise that they have a 
degree of choice in the identities they associate with, that the self is constructed 
µinside-out¶as well as µoutside-in¶(Bruner 1990, 108). 
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